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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
 No. 10-1728 
____________ 
 
F. SCOTT WINSLOW,  
                                  Appellant 
 
v. 
 
PRISON HEALTH SERVICES (PHS);  
(PA) JENNIFER PORTA;  
DR. RENATO DIAZ, (MD);  
STANLEY STANDISH, (MD) 
____________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
(D.C. Civil No. 08-cv-00785) 
District Judge:  Honorable Sylvia H. Rambo 
____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
January 11, 2011 
____________ 
 
Before: SCIRICA, BARRY and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed: January 20, 2011) 
____________ 
 
OPINION 
____________ 
 
BARRY, Circuit Judge 
 F. Scott Winslow sued Prison Health Services (“PHS”) and several of its 
 2 
employees, alleging that he received constitutionally inadequate medical treatment for a 
hernia while incarcerated at SCI-Retreat, a Pennsylvania state prison.  The District Court 
dismissed part of Winslow’s case on Defendants’ motion to dismiss and disposed of the 
remainder on Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.  Winslow appeals both 
decisions.  We will affirm. 
I.  Background
1
 
A.  Facts Prior to February 22, 2008 
 On August 19, 2007, while working at SCI-Retreat, Winslow felt a “pop” and later 
noticed a lump in his groin.  Eight days later, after treating himself with Ibuprofen, he 
reported to the medical staff.  He was instructed to return the following day, and on 
August 28, 2007, he was examined by Defendant Jennifer Porta, a physician’s assistant. 
 Porta diagnosed Winslow with a left inguinal hernia.  While she believed that the 
hernia was reducible, she could not confirm this belief, as there was inadequate space for 
Winslow to recline.  She prescribed Motrin, instructed him to avoid strenuous activity, 
and told him to sign up for sick call if his symptoms worsened. 
 On September 7, 2007, a prison nurse evaluated Winslow before he was to be 
placed in the Restricted Housing Unit (“RHU”).  The nurse found no reason that he could 
not be placed in the RHU, and the nurse’s notes are silent regarding pain or Winslow’s 
hernia. 
                                                 
1
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and we have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
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 Several months elapsed before Winslow again sought treatment pertaining to the 
hernia.  Indeed, when he was examined by Defendant Dr. Renato Diaz on January 14, 
2008, for complications relating to his asthma, Winslow made no mention of his hernia.  
He did not again seek treatment for his hernia until January 18, 2008, when Porta saw 
him, confirmed that the hernia was reducible, and scheduled an examination with 
Defendant Dr. Stanley Stanish, sued here as Dr. Standish. 
 Dr. Stanish saw Winslow on January 28, 2008.   His notes from that visit indicate 
that “since there is no evidence of incarceration or strangulation and when there is some 
drop thru there is a reduction, there is no need for surgical repair at this time.”  (App. 49.)  
Dr. Stanish prescribed Motrin, various restrictions on physical activity, and a hernia belt, 
noting that “[i]t is not what he wants but may be all he needs” and that “[b]y exam he is 
not in need of anything further.”  (Id. 50.)   According to Winslow’s deposition, Dr. 
Stanish informed him that “if you were on the street most HMOs and care facilities, they 
wouldn’t address this situation [because] it’s too costly.”  (Id. 140)  Winslow further 
stated that Dr. Stanish “went into some spiel about, you know, they don’t do that anymore 
and the management healthcare and the costs.”  (Id.)   
 Winslow returned to pick up his hernia belt on January 28, 2008.  The available 
belt was too large, however, and so another was ordered.  Before receiving his belt, 
Winslow was examined by Dr. Diaz on February 11, 2008.  Dr. Diaz agreed that the 
hernia was reducible, and so he prescribed Motrin and ordered a scrotal support.   
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Winslow was seen by Porta on February 19, 2008, as he was complaining of pain in the 
left groin and difficulty with bowel movements.  Porta prescribed Motrin and Metamucil.  
Three days later, on February 22, 2008, Winslow received his hernia belt. 
B.  Facts After the Issuance of the Hernia Belt 
 Because the District Court dismissed Winslow’s claims arising after he was issued 
a hernia belt on Defendants’ motion to dismiss, it considered only the complaint’s 
allegations pertaining to this period, the relevant portions of which are excerpted below: 
Following my family contacting the medical department I was finally issued 
a hernia belt that does nothing for the severe pain that I am in constantly. 
 
. . . 
 
The Defendants in this case specifically told me that they would not do 
anything for me until I was either being “strangled to death” or the hernia 
moves into my scrotum. 
 
Prison Health Services policies to save money and other policies are the 
direct and proximate cause of the deliberate indifference to my serious 
medical needs that I am being forced to endure. 
 
(Id. 44.) 
C.  Procedural History 
 Winslow filed suit on April 28, 2008, proceeding pro se.  Defendants moved to 
dismiss, and on October 23, 2008, the District Court dismissed the complaint to the extent 
it raised claims after February 22, 2008, the date on which Winslow received his hernia 
belt. 
 After the partial denial of Defendants’ motion, the District Court appointed 
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counsel on Winslow’s behalf.  Following discovery, Defendants moved for summary 
judgment, and the Court granted the motion on February 12, 2010.  Winslow timely 
appealed. 
III.  Discussion 
A.  Applicable Law 
 The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment requires 
prison officials to provide basic medical treatment to inmates.  See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 
U.S. 97, 104 (1976).  Critically, however, “a complaint that a physician has been 
negligent in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not state a valid claim of 
medical mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment,” and so “malpractice does not 
become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner.”  Id. at 106.  
Rather, a constitutional violation requires “deliberate indifference,” which may be 
manifested by “intentionally denying or delaying access to medical care or intentionally 
interfering with the treatment once prescribed.”  Id. at 104-05 (footnote omitted).  “[A]s 
long as a physician exercises professional judgment his behavior will not violate a 
prisoner’s constitutional rights.”  Brown v. Borough of Chambersburg, 903 F.2d 274, 278 
(3d Cir. 1990). 
A.  Motion to Dismiss:  Claims After February 22, 2008 
1.  Standard of Review 
 A court may only grant a Rule 12(b)(6) motion where the plaintiff fails to plead 
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“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”  Bell Atl. Corp. v. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).  A litigant’s pro se status requires a court to construe 
the allegations in the complaint liberally.  See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). 
2.  Analysis 
 Defendants moved to dismiss Winslow’s complaint in its entirety, arguing that the 
allegations did not support a claim of deliberate indifference.  The District Court agreed 
only in part, finding that once Winslow was issued a hernia belt, his claim became one of 
medical negligence, rather than indifference.  In other words, the Court reasoned, while 
the complaint contained a plausible claim that Winslow was denied medical care outright 
prior to the issuance of the hernia belt, once he was issued the belt, he had pleaded no 
facts suggesting that Defendants “kn[ew] of and disregard[ed] an excessive risk to inmate 
health or safety.”  See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994).  Rather, the Court 
explained, “Plaintiff may not agree with the treatment he is receiving, but that 
disagreement alone does not give rise to an Eighth Amendment claim.”  (App. 13) 
 Winslow argues on appeal that he did sufficiently plead deliberate indifference 
following the issuance of the hernia belt, as the decision to treat his hernia with a belt 
instead of with surgery was improperly motivated by non-medical factors, principally 
cost.  As noted above, the complaint alleged that Winslow was harmed by DHS “policies 
to save money,” (id. 44), and the denial of medical care, when based on non-medical 
factors, may violate the Eighth Amendment.  See Monmouth County Corr. Inst. Inmates 
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v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 346 (3d Cir. 1987) (“If necessary medical treatment is delayed 
for non-medical reasons, a case of deliberate indifference has been made out.” (internal 
quotation marks and alterations omitted)).  Nevertheless, the District Court correctly ruled 
that Winslow had failed to state a claim. 
 For one thing, the complaint’s allegation that Winslow was harmed by “policies to 
save money” is exceedingly conclusory; the complaint does not provide any indication 
either of (1) what the relevant policies are, (2) what basis he has for thinking that 
“policies to save money” affected his medical treatment, or (3) what specific treatment he 
was denied as a result of these policies.  More fundamentally, the naked assertion that 
Defendants considered cost in treating Winslow’s hernia does not suffice to state a claim 
for deliberate indifference, as prisoners do not have a constitutional right to limitless 
medical care, free of the cost constraints under which law-abiding citizens receive 
treatment.  See Reynolds v. Wagner, 128 F.3d 166, 175 (3d Cir. 1997) (“[T]he deliberate 
indifference standard of Estelle does not guarantee prisoners the right to be entirely free 
from the cost considerations that figure in the medical-care decisions made by most non-
prisoners in our society.”); Johnson v. Doughty, 433 F.3d 1001, 1013 (7th Cir. 2006) 
(“The cost of treatment alternatives is a factor in determining what constitutes adequate, 
minimum-level medical care, but medical personnel cannot simply resort to an easier 
course of treatment that they know is ineffective.” (citations omitted)); Caines v. 
Hendricks, No. 05-1701, 2007 WL 496876, at *8 (D.N.J. Feb. 9, 2007) (“[I]t is not a 
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constitutional violation for prison authorities to consider the cost implications of various 
procedures, which inevitably may result in various tests or procedures being deferred 
unless absolutely necessary.”). 
 Thus, because the complaint pleaded only that Winslow was subjectively 
dissatisfied with his medical treatment and alleged in the most conclusory terms that 
Defendants considered cost in providing his care, the District Court properly dismissed 
his claims arising after he was issued a hernia belt.  
B.  Motion for Summary Judgment:  Claims Before February 22, 2008 
1.  Standard of Review 
 We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing the 
underlying facts in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.  Pa. Coal 
Ass’n v. Babbitt, 63 F.3d 231, 236 (3d Cir. 1995).  A district court’s grant of summary 
judgment is proper only if “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any 
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 
56(a). 
2.  Analysis 
 The District Court ruled that the evidence pertaining to the period between August 
27, 2007, when Winslow first complained of hernia symptoms, and February 22, 2008, 
when he was issued a hernia belt, could not support a finding of deliberate indifference.  
Specifically, it noted that after first complaining of hernia symptoms, Winslow did not 
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again seek medical care for the hernia until January 18, 2008.  It also noted that each time 
that Winslow sought treatment for the hernia in 2008, he received treatment.  Though the 
Court recognized that Winslow wanted his hernia to be treated surgically, it concluded 
that disagreement with a medical decision that the medical provider subjectively 
perceives to be reasonable does not give rise to a constitutional claim. 
 On appeal, Winslow returns to the argument that Defendants’ refusal to order 
surgery was improperly influenced by non-medical factors.   Thus, he relies on Dr. Diaz’s 
alleged statement — made after the initiation of this litigation — that “we’re not doing 
nothing for you” because it “costs too much money.”  (App. 149).  He also points to Dr. 
Stanish’s comment that if Winslow were not incarcerated, many HMOs would decline to 
cover this procedure.  (Id. 140.)   
 Winslow is correct that there is some record evidence suggesting that Defendants 
considered the cost of his treatment, among other factors, in declining to order surgery.  
Yet the record is equally clear that Dr. Diaz and Dr. Stanish did not focus exclusively or 
even predominantly on cost and that the treatment that they ordered was consistent with 
their professional judgment.  According to Porta, “Standard medical treatment for a 
reducible hernia would be pain relief, as well as monitoring, and just generally, you know, 
precautions, safety precautions as far as lifting goes.”  (Id. 90.)  Dr. Stanish explained that 
he did not order surgery because Winslow’s hernia was not strangulated or incarcerated, 
and thus that it could heal with a more conservative treatment.  Finally, Dr. Diaz testified 
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that the standard treatment for an inguinal hernia was non-surgical, and that with proper 
treatment, a hernia could heal without surgical intervention.  Winslow challenges all of 
these statements, even offering an expert report contending that hernias generally require 
surgery.  Yet even if those persons who treated Winslow are incorrect about certain 
medical facts, negligence does not demonstrate a deliberate indifference to Winslow’s 
medical needs.  As noted above, moreover, Winslow does not have a constitutional right 
to unlimited medical care of his choosing, free from all considerations of cost.  
Accordingly, the District Court appropriately granted summary judgment to Defendants 
for claims arising prior to the issuance of a hernia belt.
2
 
III.  Conclusion 
 We will affirm the orders of the District Court.   
 
                                                 
2
 The District Court granted summary judgment to PHS on the additional ground that 
Winslow had failed to point to a specific practice or policy responsible  for his 
mistreatment.  Winslow does not challenge this holding on appeal. 
